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Abstract
We study minimum integer representations of weighted games, i.e. representations where the weights are
integers and every other integer representation is at least as large in each component. Those minimum
integer representations, if they exist at all, are linked with some solution concepts in game theory. Closing
existing gaps in the literature, we prove that each weighted game with two types of voters admits a
(unique) minimum integer representation, and give new examples for more than two types of voters
without a minimum integer representation. We characterize the possible weights in minimum integer
representations and give examples for t ≥ 4 types of voters without a minimum integer representation
preserving types, i.e. where we additionally require that the weights are equal within equivalence classes
of voters.
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1. Introduction
Simple games, or positive switching functions, can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a
single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. Weighted games,
or positive threshold functions, are possibly the most interesting subclass of simple games. Roughly
speaking, in a weighted game a non-negative weight wi is assigned to each voter 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a quota q
is specified. As an abbreviation for a weighted game we use the notation [q;w1, . . . , wn]. Winning
coalitions are those that can force a victory, i.e. the sum of their weights equals or surpasses the quota.
Weighted games naturally appear in several different contexts apart from voting, like reliability analysis
of technical systems (see Ramamurthy [27]) or neural networks (see, among others, Elgot [7] or Freixas
and Molinero [9]).
The number of simple games on a fixed set N = {1, . . . , n} is finite, of course, but it grows very
rapidly with an increasing number of voters n since we are dealing with sets of sets. Indeed, every
family of pairwise independent subsets ofN can serve as the set of minimal winning coalitions defining a
simple game. Two subsets are independent if neither contains the other. Families of independent subsets
are sometimes called “Sperner families“, “coherent systems“, or “clutters“, and their enumeration and
classification have occupied mathematicians since Dedekind in the 19th century. In his 1897 work he
determined the exact number of simple games with four or fewer players. Since that time simple games
have been investigated in a variety of different mathematical contexts. An account of some of these
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works can be found in: Sperner [29], Isbell [14], Golomb [13], Muroga et al. [23, 24], Shapley and
Shubik [28], Dubey and Shapley [4], Kurz and Tautenhahn [19, 20], Freixas and Molinero [10, 11],
Krohn and Sudho¨lter [18], Keijzer et al. [16, 17]. Although the number of weighted games compared
with the number of simple games is small, it grows very rapidly and there do not exist enumeration
results for more than nine voters.
Integer representations, i.e. where the weights wi and the quota q are non-negative integers, are very
common in practice and minimum integer representations, if they exist, constitute the most efficient
way to represent weighted games. Several algorithms to compute certain power indices require integer
weights and benefit from weights of small magnitude. When considering e.g. shareholders of a firm,
integer weights, i.e. the number of (equal) shares, arise naturally. Geometrically, the set of equivalent
integer representations of a weighted game is an unbounded cone with or without a vertex. Hence, a
natural question arises: For which weighted games does a minimum integer representation exist? Or,
in other words, for which weighted games does the associated integer cone have a vertex? Symmetric
games, i.e. games where all players have an equivalent role in the game and, therefore, are characterized
by one single type of equivalent voters, admit a minimum integer representation. But it is known that
there does not always exist a minimum integer representation for a weighted game. Muroga et al. [23] in
their exhaustive enumeration of threshold functions (or, equivalently, weighted games) uncovered several
cases with as few as eight players in which two symmetric players must be given different weights in
a minimum sum integer representation; e.g. [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2] = [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3]. Here a
minimum sum integer representation is an integer representation such that the sum of weights
∑n
i=1 wi is
minimal. Moreover, they verified that all weighted games with less than eight players admit a minimum
integer representation. We can easily check that this example consists of four types of players (a type
here is an element of a partition of N formed by equivalent voters), and each type contains players with
the same weights except for the last type, which contains players with weights 3 and 2.
To our knowledge it is not known whether there exist weighted games without a minimum integer
representation with either two or three types of players. The main goal of this paper is to ascertain what
occurs for these two cases, filling the existing gap in the theory of weighted games. Previous to Muroga
et al’s example, Isbell [14] had exhibited a remarkable 12-player example in which the affected players are
not symmetric. Thus, even if we additionally require that all players of equal type have equal weights, the
existence of a minimum integer representation preserving types is not guaranteed. Freixas and Molinero
[10, 11] uncovered several cases of weighted games without a minimum integer representation preserving
types with as few as 9 players and checked the nonexistence of such examples for less than 9 players; see
also [19]. All the examples they listed have at least 5 types of players. So quite naturally, we want to
ascertain what occurs for less than 5 types. We would like to remark that homogeneous games3 admit a
minimum integer representation as shown by Ostmann [25].
A natural third issue emerges to be significant, whenever there does not exist a minimum integer
representation for a weighted game (either preserving types or not). In that situation at least two integer
representations are minimal, but is it possible to generate weighted games with more than two minimal
representations? Since integer representations which attain the minimum possible sum of weights are
minimal, we ask more generally for constructions of weighted games with an arbitrary number of min-
imum sum integer representations. As far as we know, all the previously published examples without a
minimum integer representation (either preserving types or not) have only two minimum sum integer rep-
resentations. Additional results, we introduce here, comprise: bounds on the number of non-isomorphic
weighted games as a function of the number of voters and the number of types of voters, and the existence
of a weighted game in minimum integer representation for any pair of two coprime integer weights.
3A weighted game is called homogeneous if it admits a representation where all minimal winning coalitions have the same
weight.
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Minimum integer representations of weighted games are important in game theory: Peleg [26] proved
that for homogeneous weighted decisive games the nucleolus (a well-known solution concept in game the-
ory) coincides with the minimum integer representation preserving types. Also, in the cases where there
is no minimum integer representation preserving types, there are connections linking a minimum sum
integer representation preserving types with the least core (another solution concept) and the nucleolus of
weighted decisive games [18].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we precisely define the classes
of complete simple games and weighted games. For complete simple games we state a parameteriza-
tion theorem by Carreras and Freixas in Subsection 2.1, which completely characterizes these objects
up to isomorphism using linear inequalities. The subclass of weighted games can be defined via the
non-emptiness of certain polytopes as outlined in Subsection 2.2. The details on minimum integer repre-
sentations are stated in Subsection 2.3. In Section 3 we present constructions for weighted games without
a minimum integer representation for small t (Subsection 3.1) and for those with more than two minimum
sum integer representations (Subsection 3.2). In Subsection 3.3 we study the question of which weights
may occur in a minimum integer representation. Our main theorem, that each weighted game with two
types of voters admits a minimum integer representation, is given in Section 4. Implications for the enu-
meration or bounds on the number of weighted games, which arise as a byproduct of our previous results,
are briefly stated in Section 5. We end with a conclusion in Section 6.
2. Binary voting systems – simple games, complete simple games and weighted games
From a more general point of view, binary voting systems, i.e. those where each voter has the option to
vote yes or no, which then is condensed by a certain voting rule, can be represented by a characteristic
function χ : 2N → {0, 1}, where N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of voters and 2N denotes the set {U | U ⊆
N} of all subsets of N . A quite natural monotonicity assumption on χ leads to a very prominent class of
binary voting systems.
Definition 2.1. A simple game is a function χ : 2N → {0, 1}, which satisfies χ(∅) = 0, χ(N) = 1, and
χ(U ′) ≤ χ(U) for all U ′ ⊆ U ⊆ N , where N is a finite set.
So, if we identify 2N with {0, 1}n, each simple game is a monotone Boolean function and except for
the all-zero function and the all-one function all monotone Boolean functions are simple games. We will
call a subset U ⊆ N a coalition.
Definition 2.2. A coalition U ⊆ N of a simple game χ is called winning if χ(U) = 1 and losing
otherwise. A coalition U is called a minimal winning coalition if χ(U) = 1 and χ(U ′) = 0 for all
proper subsets U ′ of U . Similarly, a coalition U is called a maximal losing coalition if χ(U) = 0 and
χ(U ′) = 1 for all proper supersets U ′ of U . By W we denote the set of winning coalitions and by L
the set of losing coalitions for a given simple game. The restrictions to minimal winning coalitions and
maximal losing coalitions are denoted byWm and LM , respectively.
We haveW ∪L = 2N and remark that eitherWm or LM uniquely characterizes a simple game; see
e.g. [30] for the details and additional facts on simple games. A well studied subclass of simple games
(and superclass of weighted games) arises from Isbell’s desirability relation [15]:
Definition 2.3. We write i A j (or j @ i) for two voters i, j ∈ N if we have χ
(
{i} ∪ U\{j}
)
≥ χ(U)
for all {j} ⊆ U ⊆ N\{i} and we abbreviate i A j, j A i by i  j. A simple game χ is called complete
simple game (also called a “directed game”, see [18], or a “linear game”, see [30]) if the binary relation
A is a total preorder, i.e.
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(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i A j or j A i for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
W.l.o.g. we assume 1 A 2 A · · · A n in the following. Whenever i  j, voter i is as influential in
the game as voter j, meaning that it does not matter which one of both takes part in a coalition, i.e. the
status of the coalition (winning or losing) does not change after a swap of two equally desirable voters.
We can partition the whole set N of voters into equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt and say that the complete
simple game consists of t types of voters. By ni we denote the cardinality of the set Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Coalitions are categorized into different types, which can be described by a vector (m1, . . . ,mt) meaning
mi-out-of-ni voters (from the set Ni) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Let us consider an example with n1 = n2 = 2. Due to the assumed ordering of the players we have
N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4}. With this the vector (1, 1) is the type of the coalitions {1, 3}, {1, 4},
{2, 3}, and {2, 4}. Since we have 1  2 and 3  4 either all those four coalitions are winning or they are
all losing and we can therefore speak of a winning or a losing vector.
Definition 2.4. Let χ be a simple game andNh, 1 ≤ h ≤ t, be the classes of equally desirable voters. We
call a vector m˜ := (m1, . . . ,mt), where 0 ≤ mh ≤ |Nh| for 1 ≤ h ≤ t, a winning vector if χ(U) = 1,
where U is an arbitrary subset of N containing exactly mh elements of Nh for 1 ≤ h ≤ t. Analogously,
we call such a vector a losing vector if χ(U) = 0, where U is an arbitrary subset ofN containing exactly
mh elements of Nh for 1 ≤ h ≤ t.
In the following we will always use a tilde and bold notation to indicate a vector representing a type
of a coalition. The concept of inclusion has to be slightly modified for vectors, i.e. types of coalitions:
Definition 2.5. For two vectors a˜ = (a1, . . . , at) and b˜ = (b1, . . . , bt), representing types of coalitions
in a complete simple game, we write a˜  b˜ if we have
k∑
i=1
ai ≤
k∑
i=1
bi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t. For a˜  b˜ and
a˜ 6= b˜ we use a˜ ≺ b˜ as an abbreviation and say that they are comparable vectors with vector a˜ being
smaller than vector b˜. If neither a˜  b˜ nor b˜  a˜ holds, we write a˜ ./ b˜ and say that vector a˜ and
vector b˜ are incomparable.
If (1, 1) is a winning vector in our example, so is (2, 0) while nothing can be deduced for vector (0, 2).
With Definition 2.5 at hand, we can define:
Definition 2.6. A vector m˜ = (m1, . . . ,mt) in a complete simple game χ is a shift-minimal winning
vector if m˜ is a winning vector and every vector m˜′ with m˜′ ≺ m˜ is losing. Analogously, a vector m˜ is
a shift-maximal losing vector if m˜ is a losing vector and every vector m˜′ with m˜′  m˜ is winning.
Similarly as for simple games, where the set Wm or LM with the inclusion are enough to gener-
ate the entire set of winning coalitions W , for complete simple games the sets Wsm and LsM of the
shift-minimal winning vectors (representing types of coalitions) and the maximal losing vectors uniquely
characterize the complete simple game with the operation . Weighted games, which are a subclass of
complete simple games, are now formally introduced as follows:
Definition 2.7. A simple game χ is called a weighted game (or simply weighted) if there exists a quota
q ∈ R>0 and weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 such that χ(U) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈U wi ≥ q. As an
abbreviation we utilize the notation χ = [q;w1, . . . , wn] or simply χ = [q;w] whenever the weight vector
w = (w1, . . . , wn) is specified.
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As an example we consider the weighted game [4; 3, 2, 1, 1] (which is the same as [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]), where
we have 1 A 2  3  4 for the voters, i.e. n1 = 1 and n2 = 3. The shift-minimal winning vectors are
given by (1, 1), (0, 3) and the smax losing vectors are given by (1, 0), (0, 2). Since (1, 2)  (1, 1) the
coalition type (1, 2) is also winning and (0, 2) is losing due to (0, 2) ≺ (0, 3). For a more extensive
overview on binary voting methods we refer the interested reader to [30].
2.1. A parameterization theorem for complete simple games
Carreras and Freixas have given a full parameterization of complete simple games in [3]. To this end
we denote the (decreasing) lexicographic (strict) order by m, i.e. we have (a1, . . . , an)m (b1, . . . , bn) iff
there is an index 1 ≤ h ≤ n with ai = bi for all 1 ≤ i < h and ah > bh. An example is given by
(1, 2, 1)m (1, 1, 3).
Theorem 2.8. (Carreras and Freixas, 1996)
(a) Consider a vector
n = (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt>0
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
...
m˜r
 .
If they satisfy the following properties:
(i) m1,1 > 0, 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj , mi,j ∈ N≥0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t,
(ii) m˜i ./ m˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that mi,j > 0, mi,j+1 < nj+1, and
(iv) m˜i m m˜i+1 for 1 ≤ i < t,
then there exists a complete simple game χ associated to (n,M) with n as a vector of the cardinal-
ities of the equivalence classes and matrixM, where the rows consist of the shift-minimal winning
vectors.
(b) Two complete games (n1,M1) and (n2,M2) are isomorphic if and only if n1 = n2 andM1 =
M2.
In such a vector/matrix representation of a complete simple game the number of voters n is determined
by n =
∑t
i=1 ni. Although Theorem 2.8 looks technical at first glance, the necessity of the required
properties can be explained easily. First we observe that nj ≥ 1, m1,1 > 0, and 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj must
hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t. If m˜i  m˜j or m˜i  m˜j then we would have m˜i = m˜j or either m˜i
or m˜j cannot be a shift-minimal winning vector. If for a column-index 1 ≤ j < t we have mi,j = 0
or mi,j+1 = nj+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then we can check that g  h for all g ∈ Nj , h ∈ Nj+1, which
is a contradiction to the definition of the classes Nj and therefore also for the numbers nj . A complete
simple game does not change if two rows of the matrixM are interchanged. Thus we must require some
specific ordering of the rows to avoid duplicities, e.g. m.
If all voters are equivalent, i.e. t = 1, there is a unique shift-minimal winning vector, i.e. r = 1. In
this case the requirements of Theorem 2.8 are reduced to 1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1 = n. Also for t = 2 one can
easily give a more compact formulation for the requirements in Theorem 2.8. A complete description
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of the possible values n1, n2,m1,1,m1,2 corresponding to a complete simple game with parameters n,
t = 2, and r = 1 is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1, n1 + n2 = n, 1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1, and 0 ≤ m1,2 ≤ n2 − 1. (1)
For t = 2 and r ≥ 2 such a complete and compact description is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1, n1 + n2 = n, and mi,1 ≥ mi+1,1 + 1, mi,1 +mi,2 + 1 ≤ mi+1,1 +mi+1,2 (2)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
2.2. Recognizing and representing weighted games
In Definition 2.7 we have introduced the notation [q;w1, . . . , wn], consisting of a quota q and weights
wi, for a weighted game. As mentioned in the introduction there are several representations for the same
weighted game, e.g. [3; 2, 1, 1, 1], [4; 3, 2, 1, 1], [11; 9, 5, 5, 4], [q; q− 1, x, x, x] and [q; q− 2, x, x, x] with
q ≥ 6 and ⌈ q3⌉ ≤ x ≤ ⌊ q−12 ⌋ all represent the same weighted game because the subsets of N whose
weights equal or surpass the quota are invariant for all of them.
So in order to check whether two weighted games are equivalent, it makes sense to have a closer
look at the underlying discrete structure as a simple game, i.e. its characteristic function χ : 2N =
{U | U ⊆ N} → {0, 1}. As weighted games are complete simple games we often find it useful to rep-
resent the game using the matrix representation of the previous subsection, especially if we use different
weighted representations for the same game or different weights within an equivalence class of voters.
To decide whether a given complete simple game is weighted, we can utilize a linear program; see
[30] for an overview on other methods. From Definition 2.7 and the notion of minimal winning and
maximal losing coalitions we can conclude that a simple game is weighted if and only if the following
system of linear inequalities is feasible:∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ Wm,
∑
i∈T
wi < q ∀T ∈ LM , q ∈ R>0, and wi ∈ R≥0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3)
As strict inequalities, i.e., < or >, might lead to ill-defined optimization problems like e.g. maximize x
subject to x < 1, we use an equivalent formulation instead:∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ Wm,
∑
i∈T
wi ≤ q − 1 ∀T ∈ LM , and wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. (4)
As LM is not empty and thewi are non-negative, the inequality q > 0 is implied by
∑
i∈T wi ≤ q−1. By
rescaling the weights we may achieve that the difference q −maxT∈LM
∑
i∈T wi is as large as desired,
e.g. at least 1. Of course here we already have integer representations in mind, i.e. where we additionally
request wi ∈ N≥0 (see Definition 2.10). The fact that each weighted game is also a complete simple
game can be used to reduce inequality system (4).
Lemma 2.9. Given a complete simple game χ with t equivalence classes of voters the inequality sys-
tem (4) has a solution if and only if
x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q − 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM , wi ≥ wi+1 + 1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, and wt ≥ 0. (5)
has a solution.
PROOF. Let us at first assume that (q, w) is a feasible solution of (5). By setting q′ = q and w′i = wh ≥ 0
for all i ∈ Nh we will obtain a feasible solution (q′, w′) for (4). Now let S ∈ Wm be a minimal winning
coalition, x˜′ its corresponding type, and let x˜ ∈ Wsm be a vector with x˜  x˜′. With this we have∑
i∈S
w′i = x˜
′Tw ≥ x˜Tw ≥ q
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due to w1 > w2 > · · · > wt ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Similarly, for a maximal losing coalition R ∈ LM
with corresponding type y˜′, let y˜ ∈ LsM be a vector with y˜  y˜′, so that∑
i∈R
w′i = y˜
′Tw ≤ y˜Tw ≤ q − 1.
For the other direction let (q′, w′) be a feasible solution of (4). One can easily check that (q′, w′′),
where w′′i =
∑
j∈Ni w
′
j
|Ni| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is a feasible solution of (5). 
We would like to remark that those complete simple games which are not weighted can be represented
as a finite intersection of weighted games, a construction which is also used in practice [8].
2.3. Minimum integer representations
In the previous section we have already seen some different representations of weighted games, e.g. we
may assume that the difference between the weight of a winning coalition and the weight of a losing
coalition is at least one. A special kind of representation restricts the quota and the weights to integers:
Definition 2.10. For a given weighted game χ, with minimal winning coalitions Wm, maximal losing
coalitions LM , and t equivalence classes of voters, a vector (q, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Nn+1≥0 is called an integer
representation if it is a feasible solution of Inequality system (4). If we have wi = wj for all i, j ∈ Nh,
where 1 ≤ h ≤ t, then we speak of an integer representation preserving types.
We remark that each feasible solution (q, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Nn+1≥0 of (3) also satisfies inequality sys-
tem (4). Given an integer representation we can easily construct a (possibly non-integer) representation,
where the weights are equal within equivalence classes of voters by averaging the weights in each equiva-
lence class, as done in the proof of Lemma 2.9. (Every convex combination of solutions of an LP is itself
a solution.)
Definition 2.11. Given an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) for a weighted game χ with equiva-
lence classes N1, . . . , Nt the averaged representation (q, w′1, . . . , w′t) is given by w′h =
∑
i∈Nh wi
|Nh| .
So indeed each weighted game admits an integer representation preserving types.
Definition 2.12. Given a weighted game χ we call an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) a min-
imum sum integer representation, if we have
∑n
i=1 wi ≤
∑n
i=1 w
′
i for all integer representations
(q′, w′1, . . . , w
′
n). Similarly we call an integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) preserving types a min-
imum sum integer representation preserving types, if we have
∑n
i=1 wi ≤
∑n
i=1 w
′
i for all integer
representations (q′, w′1, . . . , w
′
n) preserving types.
We remark that each weighted game admits a minimum sum integer representation and a minimum sum
integer representation preserving types, but there can exist several such representations. Introducing
integer variables changes the linear programs (4) and (5) to integer linear programs (ILP), whose solution
is NP -hard in general. So, if we minimize the sum of weights
∑n
i=1 wi subject to the constraints in
inequality system (4) restricted to integer variables, each optimal solution corresponds to a minimum
sum integer representation. Similarly, if we minimize the sum of weights
∑t
i=1 niwi subject to the
constraints in inequality system (5) restricted to integer variables, each optimal solution corresponds to a
minimum sum integer representation preserving types. To our knowledge there is no known polynomial
time algorithm to determine a minimum sum integer representation. For some algebraic techniques, to
determine a minimum sum integer representation, we refer the interested reader to [2].
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By considering the following LP-relaxation of the ILP for the value of a minimum sum integer rep-
resentation we can obtain a reasonable lower bound for the sum of weights in an minimum sum integer
representation:
min
t∑
i=1
wini (6)
s.t. x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q − 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM , wi ≥ wi+1 + 1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, and wt ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.13. For a given weighted game χ with t equivalence classes of voters let ϕ be the optimal
target value of the minimization problem (6), then we have
∑n
i=1 w
′
i ≥ ϕ for all integer representations
(q′, w′1, . . . , w
′
n) of χ.
PROOF. For a given integer representation (q′, w′1, . . . , w
′
n) we show that the averaged representation
wi =
∑
j∈Ni w
′
j
|Ni| , q = q
′ is a feasible solution of inequality system (5) attaining the same sum of its
weights as the initial integer representation.
As in the proof of Lemma 2.9 we have w′j1 > w
′
j2
for all j1 ∈ Ni, j2 ∈ Ni+1. Since the w′j are
integers we conclude w′j1 ≥ w′j2 + 1 so that wi ≥ wi+1 + 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. 
A more restrictive integer representation asks for the minimum possible weight for each player simul-
taneously:
Definition 2.14. An integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) for a weighted game χ is called minimum
integer representation if for all integer representations (q′, w′1, . . . , w′n) of χ we have wi ≤ w′i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. If we restrict the allowed representations to those where the voters of the same equivalence
class Ni have an equal weight, we speak of a minimum integer representation preserving types.
In other words, a minimum integer representation, if it exists, is the least element in the partial order of
component-wise comparison of the feasible weight vectors.
In general, both representations need not exist and indeed in this paper we study conditions where they
exist and give examples where they do not exist. We would like to note that each minimum integer repre-
sentation for a weighted game is also a minimum integer representation preserving types, since otherwise
the weights could be permuted within equivalence classes of voters. On the other hand, the existence of
a minimum integer representation preserving types does not imply the existence of a minimum integer
representation. The example [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2] = [12; 7, 6, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3] from the introduction has
(14, 8, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 3, 3) as a minimum integer representation preserving types.
3. Generating conspicuous examples of games without a minimum integer representation
Motivated by the existence of weighted games without a minimum integer representation for more than
three equivalence classes of voters; see e.g. Table 3 and Table 4 of [10], we are concerned in this section
with this problem in the special case of t = 3 types of voters. As we shall see below, we propose a proce-
dure to generate weighted games with three types of voters without a minimum integer representation in
Subsection 3.1 based on the famous Coin-Exchange Problem of Frobenius [1]. Similarly, the existence of
weighted games without a minimum integer representation preserving types is known for more than four
equivalence classes of voters; see e.g. Table 2 in [11]. Thus the case t = 4 is under study here and we also
propose a procedure to generate weighted games with four types of voters without a minimum integer
representation preserving types in Subsection 3.1. Another objective of this section is to generate exam-
ples of weighted games with more than two minimum sum integer representations, which is outlined in
Subsection 3.2. Finally, Subsection 3.3 concerns weighted games with a minimum integer representation
of coprime weights.
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The Coin-Exchange Problem of Frobenius considers n ≥ 2 integers 0 < a1 < · · · < an with
gcd(a1, . . . , an) = 1 as denominations of n different coins. We say that a certain amount of money A ∈
N≥0 can be represented by the given coins, if there are n numbers xi ∈ N≥0 such that A =
n∑
i=1
aixi. As
an abbreviation we denote the set of representable integers A by 〈a1, . . . , an〉.
If a1 > 1 then some A cannot be represented, e.g. there do no exist representations for all A ∈
{1, . . . , a1 − 1}. The largest such A for a given problem is called the Frobenius number g(a1, . . . , an).
Well-known results in this context are g(a1, a2) = (a1−1)(a2−1)−1 and that exactly 12 (g(a1, a2)+1) =
1
2 (a1 − 1)(a2 − 1) non-negative integers are not representable for gcd(a1, a2) = 1. As an example we
consider a1 = 3, a2 = 5, where the set of non-negative integers which are not representable is given by
N≥0\〈a1, a2〉 = {1, 2, 4, 7}.
Almost all of the following constructions contain the game χa,b = [ab;
a︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b,
b︷ ︸︸ ︷
a, . . . , a], where
b > a ≥ 1 are coprime integers, as a subgame, i.e. the winning coalitions of χa,b are winning coalitions
in the larger game and similarly the losing coalitions of χa,b are losing coalitions of the larger game. Our
first aim is to prove a lower bound on the sum of weights of a minimum sum integer representation of
χa,b. To this end we utilize Be´zout’s identity stating that there exist integers u, v ∈ Z with ua + bv =
gcd(a, b) = 1, which can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Lemma 3.1. For coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 there exist u, v ∈ N>0 with ub− va = 1, u ≤ a, v < b.
Lemma 3.2. For coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 there exist u, v ∈ N≥0 with ub+va = ab−1, 0 ≤ u ≤ a−1,
and 1 ≤ v ≤ b− 1.
PROOF. Using Lemma 3.1 and the identity (a− u)b+ va = ab− 1 yields the stated result. 
In the following we will often use the existence of those integers u, v without explicitly referring to
Lemma 3.2. We remark that the (unique) existence of such a pair (u, v) of integers can be concluded
from Popoviciu’s theorem, which counts the number of representations for a given amount N using two
coprime integer coins a and b.
Lemma 3.3. For every integer representation (q, w1, . . . , wn) of χa,b we have
∑n
i=1 wi ≥ 2ab.
PROOF. Let u, v be integers satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.2. Due to Lemma 2.13 it suffices to
prove that the optimal solution (q′, w′1, w
′
2) of LP (6) has a target value of at least 2ab. Since (v, u) is a
losing vector and (a, 0), (0, b) are winning vectors we have uw′2+vw
′
1 ≤ q′−1, aw′1 ≥ q′, and bw′2 ≥ q′.
Multiplying the first inequality by ab yields
abuw′2 + abvw
′
1 ≤ abq′ − ab.
Adding bv times the second inequality and au times the third inequality yields
abuw′2 + abvw
′
1 ≥ (au+ bv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ab−1
q′.
Thus we conclude abq′ − q′ ≤ abq′ − ab, which is equivalent to q′ ≥ ab. Next we deduce w′1 ≥ b and
w′2 ≥ a from aw′1 ≥ q′ ≥ ab and bw′2 ≥ q′ ≥ ab. Thus we have aw′1 + bw′2 ≥ 2ab. 
Corollary 3.4. Let χ be a weighted voting game with equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt, 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ t
be two indices, and N ′1 ⊂ Ni1 , N ′2 ⊂ Ni2 be two subsets. Consider two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1,
such that |N ′1| = a and |N ′2| = b. If the restriction of χ to N ′1 ∪ N ′2 is equivalent to χa,b, then we have
q ≥ ab, wi1 ≥ b, and wi2 ≥ a for the optimal solution (q, w1, . . . , wt) of the linear program (6).
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3.1. Weighted games without a minimum integer representation for small t
In order to construct a weighted game without a minimum integer representation for t = 3 equivalence
classes of voters we choose two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 and an integer c satisfying
(1) ab− c /∈ 〈a, b〉,
(2) ab− 2c+ 1 ∈ 〈a, b〉,
(3) ab ≥ 2c− 1, and
(4) c ≥ b+ 2.
With this we consider the weighted game
χa,b,c = [ab; c− 1
2
, c− 1
2
, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
],
i.e. in the notation of a complete simple game the cardinality vector is given by n = (2, a, b).
These technically looking constraints can be interpreted as follows. Due to b ≥ a+1 ≥ 1 and c ≥ b+2
the assignment q = ab, w1 = a, w2 = b, w3 = c − 12 is a feasible solution of inequality system (5) for
χa,b,c. We remark w1 = c − 12 /∈ N. Constraint (1) requires that every (shift-maximal) losing vector
l˜ = (1, l2, l3) has a weight of at most q − 32 , while constraints (2) and (3) ensure that there exists a
winning vector m˜t = (2, t2, t3) whose weight equals exactly the quota q, i.e. 2c− 1 + t2b+ t3a = ab.
Lemma 3.5. The sum of weights of a minimum sum integer representation of χa,b,c is at least 2c−1+2ab.
PROOF. Let (q′, w′1, w
′
2, w
′
3) be the optimal solution of the linear program minimizing the sum of weights.
From Corollary 3.4 we conclude q′ ≥ ab, w′2 ≥ b, and w′3 ≥ a. Since the, above defined, vector
m˜t = (2, t2, t3), is winning we have 2w′1 + t2w
′
2 + t3w
′
3 ≥ q′ ≥ ab. Using bt2 + at3 = ab− 2c+ 1 we
conclude
2w′1 + aw
′
2 + bw
′
3 = 2w
′
1 + t2w
′
2 + t3w
′
3 + (a− t2)w′2 + (b− t3)w′3
≥ ab+ (a− t2)b+ (b− t3)a = 2ab+ ab− t2b− t3a = 2c− 1 + 2ab
and finally apply Lemma 2.13. 
Next we show that τ1 = (ab, c, c − 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . a) and τ2 = (ab, c − 1, c, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a) are
minimum sum integer representations of χa,b,c. Due to Lemma 3.5 it remains to show that both vectors are
integer representations. Coalitions of type (0,m2,m3) or (2,m2,m3) have the same weight according to
all three different weight vectors (including τ0 = (c− 12 , c− 12 , b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)). Now let (1,m2,m3) be
a winning vector. From the definition of the game χa,b,c, i.e. τ0, we conclude c− 12 +m2b+m3a ≥ ab,
which can be slightly sharpened to c − 1 + m2b + m3a ≥ ab. Thus for both weightings τ1 and τ2
the lightest coalition, i.e. the one with minimal weight, of type (1,m2,m3) has at least a weight of
c − 1 + m2b + m3a ≥ ab. Now let (1, l2, l3) be a losing coalition. Since ab − c /∈ 〈a.b〉 we have
c− 12 + bl2 + al3 ≤ ab− 32 . Thus for both weightings τ1 and τ2 the heaviest coalition of type (1, l2, l3)
has a weight of at most a weight of c+m2b+m3a ≤ ab− 1.
The final conclusion is that χa,b,c cannot admit a minimum integer representation since it has at least
two minimum sum integer representations. An example where the requested technical conditions on a, b,
and c are satisfied is given by c = 12, b = 7, a = 5.
Instead of using the general Lemma 3.5 we can consider the example directly. The game χ5,7,12 is a
complete simple game with t = 3 types of voters whose vector/matrix notation is given by n = (2, 5, 7)
and M =
2 2 1 1 1 0 0 01 0 2 1 0 5 3 0
1 3 2 4 5 0 3 7
T . The matrix of the shift-maximal losing vectors is given
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by
2 2 1 1 0 01 0 3 1 4 2
0 2 0 3 1 4
T . Solving the LP (6) yields the optimal solution (35, 11.5, 7, 5). Thus
we conclude from Lemma 2.13 that the sum of the weights in a minimum sum integer representa-
tion is at least 93. Now we can easily check that both (35, 12, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5) and
(35, 11, 12, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5) are integer representations of χ5,7,12 attaining this lower bound.
We remark that the stated representations arise by a swap of weights within the first equivalence class.
For t = 4 equivalence classes and for the situation of integer representations preserving types, we ap-
ply a similar idea and consider a game χ with cardinality vector n = (1, 1, a, b) containing χa,b as a sub-
game. The rough idea is to choose half-integer weights w1, w2 ∈ N+ 12 such that (ab, w1, w2, b, a) is an
optimal solution of LP (6) while bw1c or bw2c can be attained in (different) integer representations. Sim-
ilarly as in the example above, sufficient technical conditions can be formulated using the membership or
non-membership of certain values in 〈a, b〉. We refrain from explicitly formulating the details and instead
give an example. We choose b = 11 and a = 7, which satisfy {52, 59}∩〈7, 11〉 = ∅ and 52+59−7 ·11+
1 ∈ 〈7, 11〉. The game χ now is uniquely chosen by stating its matrix of shift-minimal winning vectors:
M =

1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 5 3 1 0 5 3 1 0 7 6 4 2 0
2 5 0 3 6 8 1 4 7 9 0 2 5 8 11

T
. The matrix of the shift-maximal
losing vectors is then given by

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 1 4 2 0 5 4 2 0 6 5 3 1
0 3 1 4 7 0 2 5 8 1 3 6 9

T
. Solving the LP (6)
yields the optimal solution (77, 24.5, 17.5, 11, 7). The sum of weights of a minimum sum integer repre-
sentation is at least 196. By checking that both (77, 25, 17, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7)
and (77, 24, 18, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7) are integer representations of χ we
conclude that they are indeed minimum sum integer representations preserving types. Thus χ does not
admit a minimum integer representation preserving types.
3.2. Weighted games with more than two minimum sum integer representations
It would be nice to have an example of a weighted game with more than two minimum sum representa-
tions preserving types. Before we give a construction that works, we briefly remark that not every reason-
able system of constraints for the representability of some expressions needs to have a solution, so that not
all construction ideas lead to success. Our first idea was to choose t = 4, two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1
and n = (1, 1, a, b). If there existed integers 0 < l2 < l1−1 < ab such that l1, l1+1, l2, l2+1 /∈ 〈a, b〉 but
ab−l1−l2+2 ∈ 〈a, b〉, then we could check that (ab, ab−l2−2+x, ab−l1−2+(2−x), b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
is a minimum sum integer representation for x ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Unfortunately the existence of such integers
l1, l2 would contradict Popoviciu’s theorem counting the number of representations, see e.g. [1]. To be
more precisely, ab− k ∈ 〈a, b〉 implies k /∈ 〈a, b〉 for all k ∈ N with a, b 6 |k.
For t = 5 we have another construction which works:
Proposition 3.6. Let b > a ≥ 1 be two coprime positive integers. Suppose we have integers l1 < l2 < l3
fulfilling
(1) b < ŵi = ab− li − 1, li /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
(2) l1 + l2 + l3 − li − ab /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, and
(3) 0 < l1 + l2 + l3 + 1− 2ab < ab, l1 + l2 + l3 + 1− 2ab ∈ 〈a, b〉.
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With this the weighted game χ = [ab; ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a], where n = (1, 1, 1, a, b),
has the following three minimum sum integer representations preserving types:
• τ1 = (ab, ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• τ2 = (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2, ŵ3 + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• τ3 = (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2 + 1, ŵ3, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
PROOF. Let (q′, w′1, w
′
2, w
′
3, w
′
4, w
′
5) be the optimal solution of the linear program minimizing the sum of
weights. From Corollary 3.4 we conclude q′ ≥ ab, w′4 ≥ b, and w′5 ≥ a. Since l1 + l2 + l3 + 1− 2ab ∈
〈a, b〉, see constraint (3), there exist integers u, v such that (1, 1, 1, u, v) is a (shift-minimal) winning
vector and ub+ va = l1 + l2 + l3 +1− 2ab. Thus we have w′1 +w′2 +w′3 + uw′4 + vw′5 ≥ q′. Inserting
this into the sum of all weights yields
w′1 + w
′
2 + w
′
3 + aw
′
4 + bw
′
5 ≥ q′ + (a− u)w′4 + (b− v)w′5
≥ ab+ 2ab− (ub+ va) = 2ab+ ŵ1 + ŵ2 + ŵ3 + 2,
i.e. each minimum sum integer representation has a weight of at least 2ab + ŵ1 + ŵ2 + ŵ3 + 2 due
Lemma 2.13.
The next step is to prove that the three stated weightings represent the game χ. So for each vector
(m1,m2,m3,m4,m5) we have to prove that its weight is less then ab or at least ab in all three different
weightings simultaneously. This can be easily verified for the cases where m1 +m2 +m3 ∈ {0, 3}.
For m1 +m2 +m3 = 1 let (1, 0, 0,m4,m5) be a losing vector, i.e. we have ŵ1 +m4b +m5a =
ab− l1 − 1+m4b+m5a ≤ ab− 1. In τ2 and τ3 the weight of the first player is increased by one, so we
need ab− l1−1+m4b+m5a ≤ ab−2, which is indeed true since ab− l1−1+m4b+m5a = ab−1 is
equivalent to l1 ∈ 〈a, b〉, i.e. it contradicts constraint (1). Increasing the weight of player one in a winning
coalition does not affect its status. Now we consider a winning vector (0, 1, 0,m4,m5), i.e. we have
ŵ2 + 1 +m4b+m5a = ab− l2 +m4b+m5a ≥ ab. In τ2 the weight of the second player is decreased
by one, so that we need ab− l2 +m4b+m5a ≥ ab+ 1, which is true since ab− l2 +m4b+m5a = ab
is equivalent to l2 ∈ 〈a, b, 〉. Due to symmetry we conclude that there are no contradictions for m3 = 1.
Form1+m2+m3 = 2 let (1, 1, 0,m4,m5) be a losing vector, i.e. we have ŵ1+ŵ2+1+m4b+m5a =
2ab− l1− l2−1+m4b+m5a ≤ ab−1. Due to l1+ l2 /∈ 〈a, b〉 the vector has a weight of at most ab−2
using the weights from τ1. Thus the vector remains losing in τ2 and τ3. Increasing the weight of player
one in a winning coalition does not affect its status. A symmetric argument applies for vectors of type
(1, 0, 1,m4,m5). Now let (0, 1, 1,m4,m5) be a winning vector, i.e. we have ŵ2+ŵ3+2+m4b+m5a =
2ab − l1 − l2 + m4b + m5a ≥ ab. Due to l1 + l2 /∈ 〈a, b〉 the vector has a weight of at least ab + 1
using the weights from τ1. Thus the vector remains winning in τ2 and τ3. Decreasing the weight of either
player two or player three by one does not cause any problems for a losing coalition.
Thus we have exhaustively checked that τ1, τ2, and τ3 are minimum sum integer representations
preserving types. 
An example where the requirements of the previous proposition are fulfilled is given by a = 17,
b = 13, l1 = 157, l2 = 161, l3 = 174, ŵ1 = 63, ŵ2 = 59, and ŵ3 = 46. A smaller example is given by
a = 13, b = 11, l1 = 93, l2 = 97, l3 = 106, ŵ1 = 49, ŵ2 = 45, and ŵ3 = 36. Furthermore we have the
following straightforward generalization:
Proposition 3.7. Let b > a ≥ 1 be two coprime integers with a > b and t be an integer with t ≥ 2.
Suppose we have integers l1 < l2 < · · · < lt fulfilling
(1) b < ŵi = ab− li − 1, li /∈ 〈a, b〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
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(2)
z∑
j=1
lij−(z−1)ab /∈ 〈a, b〉 for all 2 ≤ z < t and all subsets {i1, . . . , iz} ⊆ {1, . . . , t} of cardinality
z, and
(3) 0 <
t∑
j=1
lj + 1− (t− 1)ab < ab,
t∑
j=1
lj + 1− (t− 1)ab ∈ 〈a, b〉.
With this the weighted game χ = [ab; ŵ1, ŵ2+1, . . . , ŵt+1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a], wheren = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, a, b),
has the following t minimum sum integer representations preserving types:
• (ab, ŵ1, ŵ2 + 1, . . . , ŵt + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
• (ab, ŵ1 + 1, ŵ2, ŵ3 + 1 . . . , ŵt + 1, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
...
• (ab, ŵ1 + 1, . . . , ŵt−1 + 1, ŵt, b, . . . , b, a, . . . , a)
For t ≥ 4 we have the following examples:
t a b l1, . . . , lt
4 19 11 141, 157, 160, 179
5 19 17 249, 251, 253, 268, 287
6 29 17 389, 396, 401, 418, 430, 447
7 31 29 746, 750, 752, 777, 779, 808, 810
8 37 29 883, 891, 920, 941, 949, 970, 978, 1007
9 41 31 1086, 1100, 1106, 1117, 1127, 1137, 1158, 1168, 1199
10 43 41 1513, 1550, 1552, 1554, 1593, 1595, 1597, 1636, 1638, 1679
Conjecture 3.8. Each weighted game with t equivalence classes of voters can have at most t−2 different
minimum sum representations preserving types.
3.3. Possible weights of minimum integer representations
Instead of asking which classes of weighted games admit a minimum integer representation or a
minimum integer representation preserving types one can ask which weights are possible in a minimum
integer representation. The following theorem and remarks resolve this question for two different weights
almost completely. The stated lower bounds on the number of necessary voters n might be improved.
Theorem 3.9. For two coprime integers b > a ≥ 1 the weighted game χ = [q = ab; b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
],
where n1 ≥ a and n2 ≥ b, is in minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Let (q′, b′1, . . . , b
′
n1 , a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n2) be an arbitrary integer representation of χ, where we assume
b′1 ≥ · · · ≥ b′n1 and a′1 ≥ · · · ≥ a′n2 ≥ 0 w.l.o.g. From Isbell’s desirability relation we conclude
b′n1 > a
′
1. By Corollary 3.4 every integer representation of χ has a sum of weights of at least n1b+ n2a
and q′ ≥ ab,∑n1i=1 b′i ≥ n1b,∑n2i=1 a′i ≥ n2a. It suffices to show b′n1 ≥ b and a′n2 ≥ a.
If a′n2 < a we can assume a
′
n2 = a − 1, since convex combinations of feasible weightings are
feasible. By averaging the weights a′1, . . . a
′
n2−1 and b
′
1, . . . , b
′
n1 we obtain the (feasible, possibly non-
integer) weighting (q′, b+ t, . . . , b+ t, a+ s, . . . , a+ s, a− 1), where s ∈ Q>0, t ∈ Q≥0.
Let 0 ≤ u ≤ a− 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ b− 1 be two integers with ub+ va = q − 1 = ab− 1. Rearranging
yields u = a − 1+avb so that b divides 1 + av and we have b < av. Since (u, v) is a losing vector and
(a, 0), (0, b) are winning vectors we have
ub+ ut+ av + vs ≤ q′ − 1, ab+ at ≥ q′, and ab+ bs− s− 1 ≥ q′. (7)
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Multiplying the first inequality by ab yields
ab2u+ abut+ a2bv + abvs ≤ abq′ − ab
and bu times the second inequality plus av times the third inequality yields
ab2u+ abtu+ a2bv + absv − avs− av ≥ abq′ − q′
Combining the last two inequalities yields
q′ ≥ ab+ (s+ 1)av. (8)
We already know ab+ bs− s− 1 ≥ q′ and conclude (b− 1)s− 1 ≥ (s+ 1)av. Inserting b < av yields
the contradiction −s− 1 > b. Thus a′n2 ≥ a.
If b′n1 < b we can assume b
′
n1 = b − 1 and consider the weighting (q′, b + t, . . . , b + t, b − 1, a +
s, . . . , a+ s), with t ∈ Q>0, s ∈ Q≥0. Let again 0 ≤ u ≤ a− 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ b− 1 be two integers with
ub+ va = q − 1 = ab− 1. Here we have a < ub. An analogous calculation as before yields
q′ ≥ ab+ (t+ 1)ub
and
q′ ≤ ab+ (a− 1)t− 1.
Combining these two inequalities yields (a − 1)t − 1 ≥ (t + 1)ub. Inserting a < ub ends up in the
contradiction −t− 1 > a. 
In the following remark we want to emphasize that most of the requirements of Theorem 3.9 are
necessary:
Remark 3.10.
(1) If r = gcd(a, b) > 1, then
[
q
r ,
b
r , . . . ,
b
r ,
a
r , . . . ,
a
r
]
is a smaller representation for the same game.
(2) If b = a then there is only one type of voters with minimum representation [q′; 1, . . . , 1] for a
suitable quota q′. If b < a then the voters of type 2 would be more powerful than the voters of
type 1, which is not possible by definition.
(3) If a = 0 and b > 1 then
[⌈
q
b
⌉
, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0
]
is a smaller representation for the same game,
which is indeed the minimum integer representation.
(4) The lower bounds on n1 and n2 can be improved, e.g. based on the knowledge of u and v.
There is a generalization to weighted games with more than two types of voters:
Theorem 3.11. Let a1, . . . , at be integers such that a1 > a2 > · · · > at > 0 and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t
there is an index 1 ≤ j ≤ t with gcd(ai, aj) = 1. The weighted game
χ = [q = lcm(a1, . . . , at); a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
],
where ni ≥ lcm(a1, . . . , at)/ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in minimum integer representation.
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PROOF. For an arbitrary integer representation of χ let (q′, a′1, . . . , a
′
t) be the averaged representation with
equal (possibly non-integer) weights within each equivalence class of voters. For each index 1 ≤ i ≤ t
choose a suitable index j 6= i such that gcd(ai, aj) = 1. Let z = qaiaj ∈ N and 0 ≤ u ≤ aj − 1,
0 ≤ v ≤ ai − 1 be two integers such that uai + vaj = aiaj − 1. With this we have
−
(
(z − 1) aj + u
)
a′i − va′j + q′ ≥ 1
(z − 1)aja′i + aia′j − q′ ≥ 0
zaja
′
i − q′ ≥ 0.
Combining these inequalities with the vectors (ai, v, ai − v), (aj , aj − u, u), and
(zaiaj , zajv, (z − 1)aj(ai − v) + aiu) as multipliers yields a′i ≥ ai, a′j ≥ aj , and q′ ≥ q.
We can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters analogously to the
proof of the previous theorem. 
In the next theorem we pay for less restrictive conditions on the weights ai by a rather large bound on
the number of voters n. To this end we generalize Lemma 3.2 for more than two integers:
Lemma 3.12. Let a1, . . . , at be positive integers with t ≥ 2 and gcd(a1, . . . , at) = g. There exist t
integers ui with
t∑
i=1
uiai =
∏t
i=1 ai − g and 0 ≤ ui ≤
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
PROOF. We prove by induction on t. For t = 2 we apply Lemma 3.2 for the two integers a1g ,
a2
g . For
t > 2 let u′i be integers with
t−1∑
i=1
u′iai =
∏t−1
i=1 ai − g′ =: k and 0 ≤ u′i ≤
t−1∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj − 1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, where g′ = gcd(a1, . . . , a′t−1). We remark gcd(k, at) = g and apply Lemma 3.12 for
t = 2. 
Theorem 3.13. For integers a1 > a2 > · · · > at > 0 with gcd(a1, . . . , at) = 1 the weighted game
χ = [q =
t∏
j=1
aj ; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
],
where ni ≥ 2
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in minimum integer representation.
PROOF. Due to Lemma 3.12 there are t integers ui with
t∑
i=1
uiai = q − 1 and 0 ≤ ui ≤
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
aj −
1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. For an arbitrary integer representation of χ let (q′, a′1, . . . , a′t) be the averaged
representation with equal (possibly non-integer) weights within each equivalence class of voters. With
this the following inequalities have to be valid:
q
ai
· a′i − q′ ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t and −
t∑
i=1
uia
′
i + q
′ ≥ 1.
Summing up aiui times the ith inequality plus q times the last inequality yields q′ ≥ q. Inserting this into
the ith inequality gives a′i ≥ ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
We can treat the case of different weights within equivalence classes of voters analogously to the
proofs of the previous theorems. 
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The condition gcd(a1, . . . , at) = 1 is necessary. If we also want to use zero weights we can utilize
the next lemma:
Lemma 3.14. The weighted game [q; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
], where ai > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, is in
minimum integer representation if and only if the weighted game [q; a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
, . . . , at, . . . , at︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
nt+1
]
is in minimum integer representation.
4. Weighted games with minimum integer representations for two types of voters
As we have remarked in the introduction, all complete simple games with just one type of voters, t = 1,
are weighted and admit a minimum integer representation with all weights being equal to 1. These
games are called “symmetric“, “anonymous“ or “k-out-of-n-games“ in the literature. In the previous
section we have constructed weighted games with t = 3 equivalence classes without a minimum integer
representation. So the central question of this section (and the paper) is: what happens for two types of
voters? We first state the main result.
Theorem 4.1. Each weighted game with two types of voters admits a minimum integer representation
(q,
n1︷ ︸︸ ︷
w1, . . . , w1,
n2︷ ︸︸ ︷
w2, . . . , w2), with 1 ≤ w1 ≤ max(n1 + 1, n2), 0 ≤ w2 ≤ max(n1, n2 − 1), and
1 ≤ q ≤ (n1 + n2 − 1) · max(n1 + 1, n2). For r ≥ 2 shift-minimal winning vectors the bounds of
minimum weights can be sharpened to 1 ≤ w1 ≤ n2, 1 ≤ w2 ≤ n1, and w2 + 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n1n2.
In Section 5 we will use the bounds on q, w1, and w2 to give an upper bound on the number of
weighted voting games with two types of voters. As preliminary work we prove Theorem 4.1 for some
special cases of weighted games with two types of voters by a direct argumentation on the possible integer
representations in Subsection 4.1. The proof strategy for the remaining part is more involved. We study
linear minimization problems subject to the constraints in (5). It turns out that each target function without
negative coefficients admits an optimal integer solution. By additionally using some structure result on
the set of inequalities, which attain equality, called tight later on, we deduce the existence of a minimum
integer representation.
4.1. Proof of the main theorem for r = 1 shift-minimal winning vectors
Theorem 4.2. For a weighted game χ with two types of voters, a cardinality vector n = (n1, n2) and a
unique minimal winning coalition m˜ = (m1,m2), i.e. t = 2 and r = 1, there exists a minimum integer
representation.
PROOF. Since the game is weighted there are some restrictions on the parameters m1, m2 beyond those
from (1), i.e. 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1, n1 + n2 = n, 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1, and 0 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 1. First we exclude the
cases where 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1 and 2 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 2. Assume that (q, w1, w2) is a feasible solution of
(5). Since (m1 − 1,m2 + 2), (m1 + 1,m2 − 2) are losing vectors and (m1,m2) is a winning vector we
have
(m1 − 1)w1 + (m2 + 2)w2 ≤ q − 1 ≤ m1w1 +m2w2 − 1,
(m1 + 1)w1 + (m2 − 2)w2 ≤ q − 1 ≤ m1w1 +m2w2 − 1,
from which we conclude 2w2 ≤ w1 − 1 ≤ 2w2 − 2; a contradiction. It will turn out that χ is weighted in
the remaining cases, i.e. for m1 = n1 or m2 ∈ {0, 1, n2 − 1}.
Let (q, a1, . . . , an1 , b1, . . . , bn2) be an arbitrary integer representation with a1 ≥ · · · ≥ an1 and
b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn2 of the game χ. Due to Isbell’s desirability relation we have an1 ≥ b1 + 1.
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• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = 0:
We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = 1, b1 = · · · = bn2 = 0, q = m1 is an integer
representation of χ. Since we have ai ≥ 1 and bj ≥ 0 it is also a minimum integer representation.
• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = 1:
Since (m1, 0) and (m1 − 1, n2) are losing vectors, we can conclude bi ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 and
ai ≥ n2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = n2, b1 = · · · = bn2 = 1,
q = m1n2+1 is an integer representation of χ and thus is indeed a minimum integer representation.
• 1 ≤ m1 ≤ n1 − 1, m2 = n2 − 1:
Since the cases m2 ∈ {0, 1} were dealt previously, we assume m2 ≥ 2.
For m1 + n2 − 1 ≤ n1 the vector (m1 + n2 − 2, 0) is losing. Comparing the weights of its
corresponding coalitions with those from the shift-minimal winning vector and inserting ai ≥
bj + 1 yields bj ≥ n2 − 1 and ai ≥ n2. We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = n2,
b1 = · · · = bn2 = n2 − 1, q = m1n2 + (n2 − 1)2 is an integer representation of χ.
Form1+n2−1 > n1 we compare the losing vector (n1,m1+n2−2−n1) with the shift-minimal
winning vector and insert ai ≥ bj + 1 to deduce bj ≥ n1 − m1 + 1 and ai ≥ n1 − m1 + 2.
We can easily check that a1 = · · · = an1 = n1 + 2 − m1, b1 = · · · = bn2 = n1 + 1 − m1,
q = (m1 + n2)(n1 + 1−m1) + 2m1 − n1 − 1 is an integer representation of χ.
• m1 = n1, 0 ≤ m2 ≤ n2 − 1:
If m2 = 0 then a1 = · · · = an1 = 1, b1 = · · · = bn2 = 0, q = n1 is a minimum integer
representation. Otherwise we have the losing vectors (n1,m2 − 1) and (n1 − 1, n2) from which
we conclude bi ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 and ai ≥ n2 −m2 + 1, respectively. Thus we have q ≥
n1(n2−m2+1)+m2. We can easily check that equality is possible, so that ai = n2−m2+1 ≥ 2,
bj = 1, q = n1(n2 −m2 + 1) +m2 is a minimum integer representation.

Going over the cases of the proof of Theorem 4.2 we can check that all stated minimum integer
representations satisfy 1 ≤ w1 ≤ max(n1 + 1, n2) and 0 ≤ w2 ≤ max(n1, n2 − 1) so that 1 ≤ q ≤
(n1 + n2 − 1) ·max(n1 + 1, n2), as stated in Theorem 4.1.
To reduce the need for case differentiations in the remaining part we now completely handle the cases
where null voters or dummies, i.e. voters i such that χ(U) = χ(U ∪ {i}) for all subsets U ⊆ N\{i},
occur.
Lemma 4.3. Weighted games with two types of voters, where one class consists of null voters, admit a
minimum integer representation.
PROOF. If, as usual, the equivalence classes of the game χ are given by N1, N2, then N2 has to be the
set of null voters. By the definition of a null voter each shift-minimal winning vector (m1,m2) has to
satisfy m2 = 0. Since shift-minimal winning vectors are incomparable, we have r = 1 and can apply
Theorem 4.2. 
Also in general we can drop null voters from given games when determining minimum integer repre-
sentations or minimum sum integer representations (preserving types or not).
Lemma 4.4. Let χ be a weighted game with k null voters and χ′ be the (weighted) game arising from χ by
deleting the k null voters. If (q, w1, . . . , wn−k) is an integer representation of χ′, then (q, w1, . . . , wn−k, 0, . . . , 0)
is an integer representation of χ.
17
4.2. Proof of the main theorem for r > 1 shift-minimal winning vectors
In the following we restrict our considerations to games without null voters and r > 1 shift-minimal
winning vectors. In this case we can drop two constraints from inequality system (5).
Lemma 4.5. For a weighted game χ without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1 every vector (q, w1, w2)
is feasible for inequality system (5) if and only if it satisfies
x˜Tw ≥ q ∀ x˜ ∈ Wsm, y˜Tw ≤ q − 1 ∀ y˜ ∈ LsM . (9)
PROOF. It remains to prove that the constraints from (9) imply w1 ≥ w2 + 1 and w2 ≥ 0.
Let (a, b) ∈ Wsm with minimal a, i.e. all (m1,m2) ∈ Wsm satisfy m1 ≥ a. If a ≥ 1 and b < n2,
then (a− 1, n2) ∈ LsM . With this we conclude
aw1 + bw2 ≥ q ≥ (a− 1)w1 + n2w2 + 1,
which is equivalent to w1 ≥ (n2 − b)w2 + 1 ≥ w2 + 1. If a = 0 or b = n2 then let (c, d) ∈ Wsm with
minimal c > a, i.e. for all (m1,m2) ∈ Wsm we either have m1 = a or m1 ≥ c. With this we have
(c− 1, a+ b− c) ∈ LsM and conclude
cw1 + dw2 ≥ q ≥ (c− 1)w1 + (a+ b− c)w2 + 1,
which is equivalent to w1 ≥ (a + b − c − d)w2 + 1 ≥ w2 + 1. Thus in both cases the constraints from
(9) imply w1 ≥ w2 + 1.
In order to deduce w2 ≥ 0 we consider a winning vector (m1,m2) with m2 > 0, which must exist
since χ does not contain null voters. Thus (m1,m2 − 1) is a losing vector. Now let (l1, l2) be a shift-
maximal losing vector with (l1, l2)  (m1,m2 − 1), i.e. we have l1 ≥ m1 and l1 + l2 ≥ m1 +m2 − 1.
From (l1, l2)  (m1,m2) we conclude l1+l2 < m1+m2, so that only l1+l2 = m1+m2−1 is possible.
With this we have m1w1 +m2w2 ≥ q ≥ l1w1 + l2w2 + 1, which is equivalent to (l1 −m1)w1 + 1 ≤
(m2 − l2). Inserting w1 ≥ w2 + 1 yields (l1 −m1)w2 + 1+ (l1 −m1) ≤ (m2 − l2)w2, so that we have
w2 ≥ 1 + l1 −m1 ≥ 1. 
Let us consider an example of inequality system (9) for the complete simple game χ uniquely char-
acterized by n = (3, 3) andM =
(
2 1 0
0 3 5
)T
. The shift-maximal losing vectors are given by (1, 2)
and (0, 4), so that Inequality system (9) reads as follows.
2w1 ≥ q, w1 + 3w2 ≥ q, 5w2 ≥ q, w1 + 2w2 ≤ q − 1, and 4w2 ≤ q − 1.
If we minimize one of the objective functions f1(q, w1, w2) = q, f2(q, w1, w2) = w1, or f3(q, w1, w2) =
w2 w1 subject to those constraints, we obtain the optimal solution q = 10, w1 = 5, w2 = 2 in all three
cases. It is quite remarkable that those values are integers while we have only requested that they are
real-valued. It will turn out that this is a general phenomenon in our context.
Optimal solutions of linear programs are strongly connected with solutions of linear equation systems,
since it is well known that, if a linear program admits an optimal solution, then there is an optimal solution
attained at a corner of the set of feasible points. To this end we say that an inequality of a linear program is
tight for a given feasible point if equality is attained. In our example the inequalities 2w1 ≥ q, 5w2 ≥ q,
and w1 + 2w2 ≤ q − 1 are tight for the point (10, 5, 2), while the inequalities w1 + 3w2 ≥ q and
4w2 ≤ q − 1 are not. In our context each corner is the solution of an equation system of three tight
inequalities, as we have three (linearly independent) variables.
In Lemma 4.6, Lemma 4.7, and Lemma 4.8 we check all possible 3-element subsets of the inequalities
of (9). It turns out that whenever the corresponding 3 × 3-equation system has a unique solution, all
variables attain integer values.
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So each optimal vertex of the linear program in Lemma 4.5 is determined by three tight inequalities
of one of the types m˜Tw ≥ q or l˜Tw ≤ q − 1, since w1, w2, q ≥ 0 cannot be attained with equality. In
the following three lemmas we consider the possible cases.
Lemma 4.6. For Inequality system (9), three tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q or three tight inequali-
ties of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 have to be either linearly dependent or do not determine a solution at all.
PROOF. Consider the equation system aw1+bw2 = cw1+dw2 = ew1+fw2 = z, where z ∈ {q, q−1}.
Eliminating z leaves (a− c)w1 + (b− d)w2 = (c− e)w1 + (d− f)w2 = 0, which has either the unique
solution w1 = w2 = 0, which is infeasible for the whole inequality system, or an infinite number of
solutions due to scaling. (In the latter case the equations are linearly dependent.) 
Lemma 4.7. For Inequality system (9), two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q and one tight inequality
of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 lead to an integer solution (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) such that w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for
all feasible (q, w1, w2) or do not determine a solution at all.
PROOF. Let (a, b), (c, d) ∈ Wsm and (e, f) ∈ LsM be the vectors corresponding to the tight inequalities,
where we assume a > c. From (a, b) ./ (c, d) and a > c we conclude d > b + 1. Solving the
corresponding equation system yields ŵ1 = d−bQ , ŵ2 =
a−c
Q , and q̂ =
ad−bc
Q , where Q := fc − fa +
ad− bc− ed+ eb ∈ Z. The case Q = 0 corresponds to an equation system which does not have a unique
solution. Since we know that each feasible solution of (9) satisfies w1, w2 > 0 we can assume Q > 0 in
the following.
Let g := gcd(a− c, d− b) ≥ 1. For the weights ŵ1, ŵ2 we can easily check that coalition type (a, b)
has the same weight as coalition type (a′, b′) =
(
a− a−cg , b+ d−bg
)
. If (a′, b′) is not a winning vector,
then (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) cannot be a feasible solution. Thus (a′, b′) is a shift-minimal winning vector too. If g > 1
then we have a > a′ > c. We can checkQ′ := fc−fa′+a′d−b′c−ed+eb′ =
(
1− 1g
)
·Q > 0. Thus we
can assume w.l.o.g. that a > c is minimal within the set of shift-minimal winning vectors corresponding
to tight inequalities, i.e. we can assume g = 1.
Now we apply Lemma 3.1 and choose unique integers u, v fulfilling u(d− b)− v(a− c) = 1, where
0 < u ≤ a − c and 0 ≤ v < d − b. The coalition type (e′, f ′) = (a − u, b + v) has weight q̂ − 1Q
and thus is losing. Since all losing coalitions have weight at most q − 1 we conclude Q = 1. Thus
(e′, f ′) is indeed a shift-maximal losing vector corresponding to a tight inequality. We can easily check
Q′ = f ′c− f ′a+ad− bc− e′d+ e′b = 1 so that we can assume (e, f) = (e′, f ′) since this characterizes
the same solution.
Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
aw1 + bw2 − q ≥ 0, cw1 + dw2 − q ≥ 0, and − ew1 − fw2 + q ≥ 1.
For the basis (w1, w2, q) the inverse matrix is given by
M−1 =
1
Q
·
 d− f f − b d− be− c a− e a− c
ed− cf af − eb ad− bc
 .
If we can show that all entries of M−1 are non-negative, then we have w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for
all feasible (w1, w2, q).
From a > c and (a, b) ./ (c, d) we conclude a+ b < c+ d, so that we have a− c ≥ 1 and d− b ≥ 2.
Since e = a−u, f = b+ v with 0 < u ≤ a− c, 0 ≤ v < d− b we have a− e ≥ 1, f − b ≥ 0, e− c ≥ 0,
and d − f ≥ 1. Thus, the entries of the first two rows of M−1 are non-negative integers. For Q = 1 we
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have ad − bc = q̂ ≥ 1. From f = b + v, e = a − u we conclude af − eb = av + bu ≥ 0. The last
inequality arises from
ed− cf =︸︷︷︸
Q=1
ad− bc− (af − eb)− 1 = a(d− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
+ b(e− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− 1 ≥ 0.

Let us illustrate how Lemma 4.7 works by an example. For this purpose let the weighted game χ
be uniquely characterized by its cardinality vector n = (4, 8) and its matrix of shift-minimal winning
vectorsM =
(
4 3 2 1 0
0 1 4 6 8
)T
. An integer representation preserving types is given by the weights
w1 = 7, w2 = 3, and quota q = 24. Let us assume the that winning vectors (3, 1), (0, 8) and the
losing vector (1, 5) would correspond to tight inequalities. The solution of the corresponding equation
system is given by w1 = 72 , w2 =
3
2 , q = 12. Here the weights w1 and w2 are non-integer. So
Lemma 4.7 says that (q, w1, w2) cannot be a feasible solution of inequality system (9). Thus there must
be a constraint which is violated. The construction of (e′, f ′) in the proof precisely gives such a violation.
Since 1 · (d− b)− 2 · (a− c) = 1 the coalition (2, 3) is a losing vector with weight 11.5. We can easily
check that it is indeed a shift-maximal losing vector having a weight strictly larger than q − 1 = 11.
Starting from the infeasible vector (12, 3.5, 1.5) the proof provides us even another candidate for a
3-element subset of tight inequalities. If we replace the losing vector (1, 5) by (e′, f ′) = (2, 3), then we
obtain the solution w1 = 7, w2 = 3, q = 24, which now consists of integers. Here we have
M =
 3 1 −10 8 −1
−2 −3 1
 and M−1 =
 5 2 72 1 3
16 7 24
 .
Since the inverse matrix M−1 consists of non-negative entries, as generally shown in the proof, we have
w′1 ≥ 7, w′2 ≥ 3, and q′ ≥ 24 for every averaged integer representation (q′, w′1, w′2). To be more precise:
if we combine the inequalities 3w1 + w2 − q ≥ 0, 8w2 − q ≥ 0, and −2w1 − 3w2 + q ≥ 1 with
non-negative multipliers given by the first row on M−1, we conclude w1 ≥ 7. For the second and third
row we similarly obtain w2 ≥ 3 and q ≥ 24, respectively. Thus we have found a minimum sum integer
representation preserving types.
Lemma 4.8. For Inequality system (9), one tight inequality of type m˜Tw ≥ q and two tight inequalities
of type l˜Tw ≤ q − 1 lead to an integer solution (ŵ1, ŵ2, q̂) such that w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for
all feasible (w1, w2, q) or do not determine a solution at all.
PROOF. Let (a, b) ∈ Wsm and (c, d), (e, f) ∈ LsM be the vectors corresponding to the tight inequalities,
where we assume e > c. Solving the corresponding equation system yields ŵ1 = d−fQ , ŵ2 =
e−c
Q , and
q̂ = ad−fa+eb−bcQ , where Q := fc − fa + ad − bc − ed + eb ∈ Z. The case Q = 0 corresponds to an
equation system which does not have a unique solution. Since we know that each feasible solution of (9)
satisfies w1, w2 > 0 we can assume Q > 0 in the following.
Let g := gcd(e − c, d − f) ≥ 1. The vector (a′, b′) =
(
e− e−cg , c+ d−fg
)
has the same weight as
(a, b). So similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.7 we conclude that (a′, b′) is a shift-minimal winning vector,
which corresponds to a tight inequality. We again check that replacing (a, b) by (a′, b′) is compatible
with Q′ > 0 so that we can finally assume g = 1 w.l.o.g.
Now we apply Lemma 3.1 and choose unique integers u, v fulfilling u(d− f)− v(e− c) = 1, where
0 < u ≤ e−c and 0 ≤ v < d−f . The coalition type (a′, b′) = (c+u, d−v) has weight q−1+ 1Q . Since
losing vectors have a weight of at most q − 1 the vector is winning and we have Q = 1. Using a similar
argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.7 we conclude that (a′, b′) is indeed a shift-minimal winning vector
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corresponding to a tight inequality. We can easily check Q′ = fc − fa′ + a′d − b′c − ed + eb′ = 1 so
that we can assume (a, b) = (a′, b′) since this characterizes the same solution.
Let us have a closer look at the corresponding inequality system again:
aw1 + bw2 − q ≥ 0, −cw1 − dw2 + q ≥ 1, and − ew1 − fw2 + q ≥ 1.
For the basis (w1, w2, q) the inverse matrix is given by
M−1 =
1
Q
·
 d− f b− f d− be− c e− a a− c
ed− cf eb− af ad− bc
 .
If we can show that all entries of M−1 are non-negative, then we have w1 ≥ ŵ1, w2 ≥ ŵ2, and q ≥ q̂ for
all feasible (w1, w2, q).
From e > c and (c, d) ./ (e, f) we conclude e+ f < c+ d, so that we have e− c ≥ 1 and d− f ≥ 2.
Since a = c+u, b = d− v with 0 < u ≤ e− c, 0 ≤ v < d− f we have a− c ≥ 1, d− b ≥ 0, e− a ≥ 0,
and b− f ≥ 1. Thus, the entries of the first two rows of M−1 are non-negative integers. From e > c we
conclude ed− cf ≥ c(d− f) ≥ 0 and from a = c+ u, b = d− v we conclude ad− bc = ud+ vc ≥ 1.
The last inequality arises from
eb− af =︸︷︷︸
Q=1
1 + (ed− cf)− (ad− bc) = 1 + d(e− a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ c(b− f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥ 1.

Theorem 4.9. Let χ be a weighted game without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1. Minimizing the target
function c1w1 + c2w2 + c3q, where c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 and c1 + c2 + c3 > 0, subject to the constraints in (9)
results in a unique optimal integer solution (q, w1, w2) ∈ N3>0 satisfying 1 ≤ w1 ≤ n2, 1 ≤ w2 ≤ n1,
and w2 + 1 ≤ q ≤ 2n1n2.
PROOF. Let (q, w1, q2) be the minimum value of n1w1+n2w2 subject to the constraints in (9). We already
know that the optimum exists. This minimum is attained at a corner of the corresponding feasible set and
thus arises as the unique solution of a 3 × 3-equation system, consisting of three tight inequalities. Due
to Lemma 4.6 we can apply either Lemma 4.7 or Lemma 4.8. Thus, each feasible solution (q′, w′1, w
′
2) of
inequality system (9) has to satisfy q′ ≥ q, w′1 ≥ w1, and w′2 ≥ w2. So we have c1w′1 + c2w′2 + c3q′ ≥
c1w1+ c2w2+ c3q, where equality is attained if and only if (q′, w′1, w
′
2) = (q, w1, w2). The formulas for
w1, w2 and q in Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8 give the upper bounds w1 ≤ n2, w2 ≤ n1, and q ≤ 2n1n2.
Since χ does not contain null voters we also have w1, w2 ≥ 1. If q ≤ w2, then every single voter would
form a winning coalition, so that we only have one equivalence class, which contradicts t = 2. 
To prove Theorem 4.1, we show that the unique optimal integer solution (q, w1, w2) from Theorem 4.9
is indeed a minimum integer representation. To this end we state that for two feasible solutions (q, w)
and (q′, w′) of Inequality system (4) the vector λ · (q, w)+ (1−λ) · (q′, w′) is also a feasible solution for
all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4.10. Given a weighted game χ without null voters and with t = 2, r > 1, let (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈
N3>0 be a feasible solution of (9), which minimizes the sum of weights n1ŵ1 + n2ŵ2. For each integer
representation (q, a1, . . . , an1 , b1, . . . bn2) of χ we have ai ≥ ŵ1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and bj ≥ ŵ2 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n2.
PROOF. It suffices to conclude a contradiction both from an1 ≤ ŵ1 − 1 and bn2 ≤ ŵ2 − 1. To shorten
the presentation we deal with the first case only. Since 1n1 ·
∑n1
i=1 ai ≥ ŵ1 we can assume n1 ≥ 2 and
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since every convex combination of a feasible weighting is feasible we can assume an1 = ŵ1 − 1 w.l.o.g.
Next we set a :=
∑n1−1
i=1 ai
n1−1 and b :=
∑n2
i=1 bi
n2
. With this the vector
(q, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1−1
, ŵ1 − 1, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
)
is also a feasible solution of (4), where we have a ≥ ŵ1 + 1n1−1 > ŵ1.
Next we want to utilize the concept of tight inequalities to use a formula between the parameters of
the tight inequalities and ŵ1. Due to Lemma 4.6 we have to distinguish the cases of Lemma 4.7 and
Lemma 4.8 only.
If there are two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≥ q for (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2), see Lemma 4.7, then let (c1, d1),
(c2, d2) be the two corresponding winning vectors satisfying c1 > c2 and d1 < d2. Due to Lemma 4.7
we have ŵ1 = d2 − d1. Next we choose two non-negative integers u ≤ c1 − c2 and v ≤ d2 − d1 such
that u · (d2 − d1)− v(c1 − c2) = 1. We remark u ≥ 1. With this (c3, d3) := (c1 − u, d1 + v) is a losing
vector corresponding to a tight inequality. Since (c1, d1), (c2, d2) are winning, (c3, d3) is losing, c1 ≥ 1,
c2 < n1, and c3 < n1 we have
(c1 − 1) · a+ 1 · (ŵ1 − 1) + d1 · b− q ≥ 0, c2 · a+ d2 · b− q ≥ 0, and − c3 · a− d3 · b+ q ≥ 1.
Summing up d2 − d3 times the first, d3 − d1 times the second, and d2 − d1 times the third inequality
yields
(1− d2 + d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
) a︸︷︷︸
>ŵ1
+ (d2 − d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)ŵ1 − (d2 − d3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) ≥ d2 − d1,
from which we conclude the contradiction
ŵ1 > d2 − d1 = ŵ1.
If there are two tight inequalities of type m˜Tw ≤ q − 1 for (q̂, ŵ1, ŵ2), see Lemma 4.8, then let
(c1, d1), (c2, d2) be the two corresponding losing vectors satisfying c1 < c2 and d1 > d2. Due to
Lemma 4.8 we have ŵ1 = d2−d1. Next we choose two non-negative integers u ≤ c2−c1 and v ≤ d1−d2
such that u · (d1 − d2)− v(c2 − c1) = 1. We remark u ≥ 1. With this (c3, d3) := (c1 + u, d1 − v) is a
winning vector corresponding to a tight inequality. Thus we have
(c3−1)·a+1·(ŵ1−1)+d3·b−q ≥ 0, −c1·a−d1·b+q ≥ 1, and −(c2−1)·a−1·(ŵ1−1)−d2·b+q ≥ 1.
Summing up d1 − d2 times the first, d3 − d2 times the second, and d1 − d3 times the third inequality
yields the contradiction ŵ1 > ŵ1.
Thus the assumption an1 ≤ ŵ1 − 1 cannot be true and we have ai ≥ ŵ1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. Similar
arguments can be outlined for bj ≥ w˜2 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n2. 
Remark 4.11. Due to the above lemmas we can algorithmically determine a minimum integer represen-
tation in O
(
|Wsm|3 log(n) log log(n) + |Wsm|2 log2(n) log log(n)
)
time. The case |Wsm| = r = 1
can be dealt directly using Lemma 4.2. For r ≥ 2 we consider all pairs of shift-minimal winning vec-
tors and all pairs of shift-maximal losing vectors. Here we have
∣∣LsM ∣∣ ≤ |Wsm| + 1 and |Wsm| ≤
min
(
n1 + 1,
⌊
n2+2
2
⌋) ≤ ⌊n+33 ⌋ due to Inequality system (2). For each, inWsm×Wsm or LsM ×LsM
we calculate the parameters u and v via the Euclidean algorithm to determine the third tight vector, see
Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8, respectively. So we have to consider at most |Wsm|2+∣∣LsM ∣∣2 cases. In each
case the Euclidean algorithm performs at most log(n) steps where numbers between−n and n are added
and divided. After solving the 3 × 3-equation system, which can be done in time O(log(n) log log(n)),
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we only have to check if the solution is feasible. Checking the feasibility means determining the minimal
weight of a winning vector and the maximal weight of a losing vector, which can be done usingO(|Wsm|)
multiplications and additions.
Since the minimal possible values of w1, w2, and q can be bounded via w1 ≤ max(n1 + 1, n2),
w2 ≤ max(n1, n2− 1), and q ≤ (n1+n2) ·max(n1+1, n2) we may also determine a minimum integer
representation by trying out all possibilities, which results in a pseudo-polynomial algorithm.
Due to the famous LLL-algorithm [21, 22] integer linear programs with a fixed number of dimensions,
i.e. the number of variables, and a fixed number of constraints can be solved in polynomial time. For a
two variables integer program defined by m constraints involving coefficients with at most s bits there is
a O(m+ logm log s)M(s) algorithm [6], where M(s) is the time needed for s-bit integer multiplication
(we assume M(s) = s log s log log s). For t = 2 types of voters we have
∣∣LsM ∣∣ , |Wsm| ≤ ⌊n+63 ⌋, so
that m = |Wsm| · ∣∣LsM ∣∣+ n ∈ O(n2), and s ∈ O(log n) using the ILP formulation without the quota q.
For a general but fixed number of variables Clarkson’s sampling algorithm needs an expected number
of O(m + s logm) arithmetic operations [5]. Using the ILP formulation with an extra variable for the
quota q we have m = |Wsm|+ ∣∣LsM ∣∣+n ∈ O(nt−1) and s ∈ O(log n) for t types of voters. We would
like to remark that the number of minimal winning vectors can be exponential in n whenever the number
t of types of voters is not restricted; see e.g. [18].
5. Enumerations and bounds for the number of weighted games
Besides studying properties of complete simple games and weighted games one can also enumerate these
special classes of cooperative games for small numbers of players n. In some cases enumeration results
provide a deeper understanding. So far the number of complete simple games of weighted games is only
known up to n = 9; see e.g. [10, 20]. Additionally restricting the parameters t (the number of types of
voters) and/or r (the number of shift-minimal winning vectors) opens the possibility to determine enu-
meration formulas in some cases. A widely known result in this context is csg(n, 1) = wvg(n, 1) = n,
where csg(n, t) denotes the number of complete simple games with n voters partitioned into t equiva-
lence classes. Similarly wvg(n, t) denotes the number of weighted games with n voters occurring in t
different types. In [12] the authors have determined the formula cs(n, 2) = Fib(n+6)− (n2+4n+8),
where Fib(n) denotes the n-th Fibonacci number; see also [20] for an alternative proof. So we know that
cs(n, t) is at least exponential in n for t ≥ 2. In this section we want to show that the situation changes
for weighted games by proving a polynomial upper bound on wm(n, t) in Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3.
It remains to come up with an exact formula for wm(n, 2).
If we refine our counts to the numbers csg(n, t, r) and wvg(n, t, r) by additionally considering the
number r of shift-minimal winning vectors, more results can be obtained. In [20] an algorithm is given to
principally determine an exact formula for csg(n, t, r) whenever t and r are fixed. So far it is not known
whether this can also be done for the number wvg(n, t, r) of weighted games with t types of voters and
r shift-minimal winning vectors. For r = 1 it is not too difficult to come up with such enumeration
formulas as we will demonstrate for t = 2. Having an exact characterization of the weighted games with
t = 2 and r = 1 at hand, see the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can easily determine a formula for their
number:
Corollary 5.1. The number wm(n, 2, 1) of weighted games with t = 2 and r = 1 is given by n − 1 for
n ≤ 2 and 2(n− 2)2 + 2 for n ≥ 3.
If we skip the parameter r then we can only state an upper bound:
Theorem 5.2. wm(n, 2) ≤ n515 + 4n4.
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PROOF. Due to the bounds in the minimum integer representation for r ≥ 2 in Theorem 4.1 and Corol-
lary 5.1 the number wm(n, 2) of weighted games with n voters and two types of voters is upper bounded
by
2(n−2)2+2+
n−1∑
n1=1
n−n1∑
w1=1
n1∑
w2=0
2n1(n−n1)∑
q=1
1 = 2(n−2)2+2+2
n−1∑
n1=1
(n−n1)2(n1+1)n1 ≤ n
5
15
+4n4.

For an arbitrary number t of types of voters we can determine the following polynomial upper bound:
Theorem 5.3.
wm(n, t) < (tn)t
3+2t2 .
PROOF. Let us denote the weight vector by w, the shift-minimal winning vectors by m˜i, and the shift-
maximal losing vectors by l˜j . A complete simple game described by the m˜i or the l˜j is weighted if and
only if the system of inequalities (
m˜i − l˜j
)
wT > 0 (10)
has a non-negative solution w (for all i, j).
Since λw is also a solution for all λ > 0 whenever w is a solution, we consider the equivalent system(
m˜i − l˜j
)
wT ≥ 1. (11)
Such a system of linear inequalities corresponds to a polytope whose vertices correspond to n-element
subsets of the constraints which are attained with equality. Using the fact that the coefficients of this
system of linear inequalities are integers between −(n − 1) and n − 1 we can apply Cramers rule to
conclude that vertices of this polytope can be written as vi =
(
w1 . . . wt
)
=
(
a2,i
b2,i
. . .
at,i
bt,i
)
,
where 0 ≤ aj,i ≤ (t− 1)!(n− 1)t and 1 ≤ bj,i ≤ (t− 1)!(n− 1)t. Here the common denominator g is
bounded from above by
(
(t− 1)!(n− 1)t
)t
.
Thus multiplying vertex vi with g yields integer weights w˜i between 0 and
(
(t − 1)!(n − 1)t
)t+1
.
There are at most (tn)t
3+t2 possible tuples of integer weights to be considered. The quota can be chosen
as the minimum weight of a winning coalition. Since there are less than nt possibilities for the numbers
ni of voters in the t equivalence classes, the proposed upper bound on wm(n, t) follows. 
6. Concluding remarks
The main result of this paper is that weighted games with two types of players admit a minimum integer
representation. For three types of players this need not to be the case. We have shown that by providing
examples of games without a minimum integer representation.
We found examples of weighted games with four types of voters without a minimum integer represen-
tation preserving types. It is still an open problem to clarify whether all weighted games with three types
of voters admit a minimum integer representation preserving types. To adres this lacuna we have tried to
generalize our technique from Subsection 4.2. One may consider the linear program minimizing the sum
of the weights and have a closer look at the corners of the corresponding polytope, which are characterized
by four equations corresponding to four tight types of coalitions (shift-maximal losing or shift-minimal
winning vectors).
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As demonstrated in Subsection 4.2 for three tight types of coalitions, the resulting weights and the
quota could be fractional. But using the extended Euclidean algorithm we were able to construct another
type of a coalition which contradicts the tightness of the starting three vectors in these cases. For four tight
types of coalitions (and the variables q, w1, w2, and w3) we may go along the same lines and use the ex-
tended Euclidean algorithm for three integers in order to deduce some restrictions on quadruples of tight
types of coalitions. This indeed works, but there still remain cases where the optimal LP solution is frac-
tional. By generating random weighted games with three types of voters we have discovered several such
examples, some of them are given below. For each example we state the sizes of the equivalence classes
n = (n1, n2, n3), the non-integer minimum sum representation preserving types τr = (q, w1, w2, w3),
and the minimum sum integer representation preserving types τi = (q, w1, w2, w3):
(1) n = (9, 62, 71), τr = (154.3, 38.3, 22.6, 6.6), τi = (185, 46, 27, 8)
(2) n = (19, 52, 65), τr = (3984.2, 200, 110, 76.6), τi = (5617, 282, 155, 108)
(3) n = (30, 93, 30), τr = (122.3, 22.3, 16, 9.3), τi = (131, 24, 17, 10)
(4) n = (8, 99, 10), τr = (51, 17, 10.5, 4.5), τi = (57, 19, 12, 5)
(5) n = (3, 71, 37), τr = (347.5, 100, 31.5, 15), τi = (441, 127, 40, 19)
Originally we have obtained the values of τi by minimizing n1w1 + n2w2 + n3w3 but it turned out that
in all of these (and the other found) cases we have a minimum integer representation preserving types,
so that minimizing w1, w2, w3, or q would yield the same result. We would like to remark that we
have also found some example where only one value is non-integer. Although in our experiments the
only occurring denominators were 2, 3, and 5, we do not think that the denominators are bounded by a
constant. So far we have a very poor probabilistic model which generates those examples with a very low
probability. Nevertheless we have a strong feeling that each weighted game with three types of voters
admits a minimum integer representation preserving types. As a small justification we would like to
remark that we have tried some specific parametric constructions which provably do not contain counter
examples.
We leave the challenging question of whether each weighted games with three types of voters admits
an minimum integer representation preserving types open for the interested reader and hope that our
specific examples might help to get some useful insights. One can get a first glimpse of the difficulty of
this problem by comparing the values of τr and τi in our examples.
Weighted games with an arbitrary number of minimum sum integer representations have been gen-
erated in Subsection 3.2. Moreover, some bounds have been obtained for the number of non-isomorphic
weighted games depending on the number of voters and on the number of types of voters, and the exis-
tence of a weighted game, in minimum integer representation for any pair of two coprime integer weights,
has been determined.
Other interesting open problems in the context of this paper are the question for a weighted game
with a unique minimum sum integer representation, but without a minimum integer representation, and
the question for a polynomial time algorithm to determine minimum sum integer representations for
weighted games or a proof that this problem is NP -hard.
Another important line of research would be to deepen our understanding of the link between mini-
mum integer representations of weighted games and one-point solution concepts, like the nucleolus, least
core, etc.; see e.g. [18, 26].
Of course the techniques presented in this paper may be applied to study similar questions for roughly
weighted games.
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